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11. Introduction
Scienti￿c testing of the net impact of microcredit is very di¢ cult.
It is possible to identify a speci￿c question which represents the
core of every serious impact study: if we ￿nd out that people who
have obtained loans are doing better than those who haven￿ t, does
it necessarily mean that receiving loans caused the positive change?
In other words, the problem is to understand how outcomes have
changed with the program compared to what would have happened
without the program implementation.
The most important challenge, in this particular context, has been
to determine a control group for comparison; it is very hard to
identify a group of people who are like the program participants
in all relevant features apart from not having received funds. The
critical issue to evaluate how micro￿nance works is the measure-
ment of the net e⁄ects caused by the programs.
As outlined by Armend￿riz, Morduch (2010), the ￿rst contribu-
tions of microcredit impact literature mainly concerned non-experimental
methods. In this context, researchers use treatment and con-
trol groups, but do not randomly assign subjects to the groups.
The critical point in such studies is to establish causality relation-
ships. Moreover, biases from omitted variables, non-random pro-
gram placement, client selection and self selection, and attrition
lead to important estimation problems (Karlan, 2001).
Some kinds of biases can be reduced by using longitudinal data.
The e⁄ects of non-random participation and non-random program
placement, under speci￿c assumptions, can be mitigated by the
implementation of this strategy. But if there are unobservable vari-
ables that change over time, attributes hard to measure such as
entrepreneurial organization and business skills are probably cor-
related with participation status. The most popular longitudinal
studies have been sponsored by USAID in the second part of 1990s.
Researchers investigated net impacts on members of three di⁄erent
institutions: a microlender organization operating in the informal
sector (SEWA) located in Ahmedabad (India), an ACCION In-
ternational a¢ liate (Mibanco) situated in Peru and the Zambuko
Trust in Zimbabwe. The sample households were observed a ￿rst
time to collect baseline data, and then, after two years, they were
resurveyed (Armend￿riz, Morduch, 2010).
Some empirical work is based on household surveys from the World
Bank and the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies in
2Bangladesh. The studies that exercise the most in￿ uence on the
research community are Pitt and Khander (1998) and Khander
(2005). As regards PK approach, they use cross-section data (from
the three seasonal rounds in 1991/1992), while Khander takes into
account the panel dimension of the data set (he also uses the 1999
round) in order to strengthen identi￿cation. To follow, many other
studies are based on this data set. We report, for instance, Khan-
der (1996, 2000), Pitt et al. (1999), McKernan (2002), Pitt and
Khander (2002), Pitt et al. (2003), Menon (2005), and Pitt, Khan-
der and Cartwright (2006).1
Concerning experimental approach, randomized controlled trials
(RCTs) , when done correctly, can really provide credible and
transparent estimates in di¢ cult contexts. Such approach consists
of giving loans to a subgroup randomly drawn from the population
( for instance through a random algorithm to select people from a
list), while the other subgroup, also randomly selected, will not ob-
tain any funds.Using randomized approach, the di⁄erence in terms
of average outcome between the two distinct groups represents a
good estimate of the program￿ s average impact. Under determinate
assumptions, the result can be interpreted as the causal impact of
microcredit introduction.2
However, we must notice that it is an average impact; therefore,
if half of the participants gains by 100 percent while the other
half loses by 100 percent, the average impact will be zero. In a
similar context, zero is a clean estimate of the average impact, but
it doesn￿ t give us any relevant information about an individual￿ s
performance.
In order to obtain credible estimates, it is important that neither
agreement to participate in the experiment nor the tendency to
drop out are systematically related to outcomes of interest.
Randomization approaches also have limits: few published exper-
imental studies of micro￿nance have been able to highlight short-
term results only.
Banerjee et al.(2009) and Karlan and Zinman (2009) looked at mi-
crocredit participants over a short period of time ( 12-18 months).
They didn￿ t ￿nd any kind of improvement in household income
or consumption, but both the studies showed some other bene￿ts.
1For a more complete literature review, see Armend￿riz, Morduch, 2010.
2Because of RCTs implementation, loans represent the only ex-ante di⁄erence
between the treatment and the control groups.
3The former concerns a randomized evaluation on the community-
level impact of the introduction of new branches of a local micro￿-
nance bank. The baseline sample was randomly selected from ur-
ban Hyderabad (India) for the opening of new micro￿nance branches.
Before new institutions opened, 69 percent of the households had at
least one outstanding loan from informal channels (moneylenders,
family, friends). The authors found that the new branches settle-
ment caused, in the interested areas, more new business openings,
higher purchases of durable goods and relevant pro￿ts in existing
business activities. However, it￿ s important to note that the main
e⁄ects concern target households starting new businesses, and the
authors can￿ t tell if the funds are actually invested in business
activities or not.
Interestingly, Dupas and Robinson (2009) conducted a randomized
￿eld experiment in Kenya that found short-term welfare improve-
ment regarding micro-savings, not microcredit.
They gave interest-free savings accounts in a local micro￿nance
institution to a random sample of small entrepreneurs; these ac-
counts did not pay interest and charged withdrawal fees, but they
represented the only opportunity for formal savings in the area.
The results suggested wide variation in the intensity of formal ac-
count usage. Some microentrepreneurs did not accept the pro-
posal, and many accepted without using the account e⁄ectively;
roughly 50 percent of those with accounts used them only rarely,
and only a small minority used them frequently.
Clients of this service increased their investment and daily expendi-
tures for women, but there was no evidence in terms of men impact.
However, this study presents a few shortcomings: ￿rst, the random
sample is small (185 microentrepreneurs) and only few clients used
the account frequently. Moreover, the target area of experiment
was limited to a single site and to a single micro￿nance bank .
Karlan and Zinman (2008) conducted a randomized experiment in
South Africa. The authors asked loan o¢ cers of a local lender to
revalue and accept applicants for a microloan from a set who were
initially refused but who got just below the cutt-o⁄.
Many applicants who were reconsidered (but not all) showed in-
come improvements and a more positive outlook on the future.
Despite of a micro-entrepreneur set rejected and not reconsidered,
they registered a higher level of stress and depression.
4The results of this study can￿ t generalize to other micro￿nance
contexts, because the loans were consumer loans, not typically used
for investments in business activities. In addition, applicants were
not very poor, and interest rates were higher than those applied
by typical micro￿nance institutions (Rosenberg, 2010).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next
section provides a brief description of microcredit and its princi-
pal objectives, among which poverty alleviation. Section 3 gives a
sketchy outline of the problems arising from reverse causation and
selection bias in order to discuss about the econometric method-
ologies to use. Section 4 and section 5 respectively describe the
two distinct empirical approaches, examining the results reached
in both ￿elds on the basis of recent literature. Section 6 com-
pares randomized and non-randomized strategies. The last section
concludes with a discussion of the principal impact issues.
2. De￿nition and aims of Microcredit
According to its basic de￿nition, microcredit involves small loans
to poor people for self employment projects that produce income,
allowing them to care for themselves and their families.3 These
individuals, also called "unbankable", lack any kind of economic
collateral and a veri￿able (and valuable) credit history to o⁄er a
traditional bank. Hence, they cannot meet the basic quali￿cations
required to access formal credit. Microcredit can be considered a
￿eld of micro￿nance, which embraces the provision of a wider range
of ￿nancial services designed for the very poor. As highlighted by
Armendariz, Morduch (2010), recently the terms microcredit and
micro￿nance have often been used interchangeably even if they
show some remarkable di⁄erences. The original focus on microcre-
dit mainly concerned poverty reduction and social change, and the
most important institutions involved were NGOs. Then, the shift
to micro￿nance arose from the growing need of poor households for
a broader range of ￿nancial services (like savings) and not exclu-
sively credit for entrepreneurial activities. As a result, this lexical
transition has produced an orientation change, toward less poor
people and toward a di⁄erent kinds of organizations, commercially
oriented and with strong ￿nancial regulations.
The termmicrocredit is often used in distinct contexts (rural credit,
agricultural credit, consumer credit, etc.) with di⁄erent implica-
tions. In order to clarify the target and the speci￿c objectives of
3http://w.w.w.microcreditsummit.org
5the programmes, we introduce a broader classi￿cation to identify
the various categories.
On the basis of Yunus taxonomy4, it is possible to identify ￿ve
di⁄erent kinds of microcredit:
- Traditional informal microcredit (moneylender￿ s credit, pawn
shops, loans from friends and relatives, consumer credit in infor-
mal markets). Amongst those of that sector local moneylenders are
an important source of credit to those borrowers usually refused
by most ￿nancial institutions because of their particular economic
conditions. Low income and lack of collateral and stable employ-
ment do not make borrowers creditworthy in the eyes of traditional
banks. Moneylenders are better at serving clients neglected by the
formal sector because they have a considerable market knowledge
and lower transaction costs. At the same time, they can easily
monitor borrower behaviour because of their proximity to the client
and reliable information about his or her status. Poor people turn
to moneylenders mainly for consumer loans or to cope with emer-
gencies like health problems or to pay for high outlay connected
with education, wedding, funerals, and so on. Hence this source
of credit cannot be considered a valid engine of inclusion and local
growth.
- Microcredit based on traditional informal groups (tontine, ROSCA).
Tontine can be compared to our life insurance. The basic scheme
is simple. Each participant contributes a sum of money to the ton-
tine and, then, he receives an annual dividend on his investment.
When each participant dies, his or her share is reallocated among
the surviving subscribers, until only one investor survives. ROSCA
(Rotating Savings and Credit Association) consists of a group of in-
dividuals who agree to meet for a speci￿c period of time in order to
save and borrow money from a common "pot", usually allocated to
one member of the group (who changes each period). Both kinds
of microcredit pursue partially di⁄erent objectives compared to
modern microcredit. The aim of tontine concerns insurance, while
ROSCAs ￿nance consumer credit (Armend￿riz-Morduch, 2010).
- Microcredit through traditional banks, generally specialised in
speci￿c investment sectors (agricultural credit, livestock credit,
￿sheries credit, handloom credit, etc.).
- Cooperative microcredit and rural credit through specialised banks.
4http://www.grameen-info.org
6- Modern microcredit (Grameen credit, bank-ONGs partnership
based microcredit and consumer microcredit). Small loans typi-
cally designed for low-income clients who traditionally lack access
to commercial banking for several reasons (absence of collateral,
informal employment, unveri￿able credit history, high transaction
costs). This kind of credit allows poor people to start new en-
trepreneurial activities, expand existing businesses, to cope with
shocks due to adverse climatic conditions and illness, and smooth
out consumption.
Concerning the last category of microcredit, three models for lend-
ing have become globally popular: village banking, solidarity groups,
and individual lending. The choice of lending technology relies on
the speci￿c characteristics and needs of the target areas.
The village banking approach is most similar to the old cooperative
credit movement. This method was innovated by FINCA Interna-
tional founder, John Hatch. A village bank is an informal self-help
support group of 20-30 participants ( predominantly women). The
￿rst loan comes from an institution like MFI or NGO, then follow-
ing deposits come from individual savings amounts in group funds.
For example, if the ￿rst loan is $ 50 and the participant saves in
the same period $ 10, the second loan will be equal to $ 60. The
length of the loan cycle is 4-6 months5. SHGs (self-help groups)
have dominated the micro￿nance landscape especially in India.
These involve small groups of 10-20 members that collect savings
from their participants and, at the same time, provide them with
loans. The members are jointly and severally liable for the funds
obtained within the group itself (Nair, 2005).
Solidarity groups is a lending mechanism which allows a group of
people to provide collateral through a group repayment pledge6.Usually
borrower groups are made up of three to seven members, most com-
monly ￿ve7, and the patterns of disbursements and repayments is
5For detailed information, see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Village_Banking
6http://www.accion.org/ Group_Lending
7Five is the right size of a Grameen group. Grameen Bank (or Rural Bank)
was started by Muhammad Yunus, a Professor of the University of Chittagong
(Bangladesh) in 1976. The bank mainly targeted rural women for its credit pro-
grammes. It introduced group lending strategy to make credit available to the poor,
usually denied by commercial loans because of the lack of physical collateral. The
income-generation also aims to empower the women and increases their participa-
tion in household decisions. For more details about its "mission" and history, see
Armend￿riz, Morduch, 2010, chapter 4.
7regimented. According to the Grameen model, payments start im-
mediately after disbursement every week. In practice, the ￿rst two
participants take their loans and begin with repayment, then two
more, and ￿nally the ￿fth. The eligibility to further and larger
amounts of funds is subject to the repayment of all group loans.
Each borrower is responsible for the repayment of all the other
loans within the group (joint liability). The advantages of this
methodology concern lenders and customers. First, it is conve-
nient for villagers because the bank comes to them (as in the cases
of ROSCAs and local moneylenders), avoiding logistic and admin-
istrative problems. At the same time, for the lender, transaction
costs connected to loan disbursement are considerably reduced.
Although this methods boasts some evident strengths, the higher
likelihood of group failure in the event of a single default, the huge
training costs and the greater ￿nancial responsibility for others in
a group have to be taken into consideration when looking into its
implementation (Armend￿riz, Morduch, 2010).
The case of individual lending substantially di⁄ers from previous
approaches. Typically, microcredit is associated with group struc-
tures (solidarity groups or village banks). Whilst the ￿rst two
lending models serve the poorest, individual lending serves less
poor clients. This targeting choice arises from the high costs of
underwriting new loans, monitoring behaviour and repayment of
disbursed funds, and enforcing repayment process. Group lend-
ing strategies, as mentioned above, shift much of the responsibil-
ity onto borrowers, while lending to individuals involves (for the
MFI) managing these costs directly. Interestingly, however, some
microcredit institutions do not o⁄er group but individual loans.
BDB (Bank Dagang Bali) and BRI (Bank Rakyat Indonesia), two
Indonesian private banks, are revealing examples of individual mi-
cro￿nance8. As in conventional lending, loan o¢ cers take collateral
and collect information from credit bureaus, require pledges of ti-
tle to land or to other property. Sometimes, the individual lending
is a part of a larger "credit plus" program, where other particu-
lar kinds of services (such as skill development, education, health,
etc.) are provided.
To sum up, it is possible to highlight some general key objectives
of the microcredit programmes:
(a) to provide small loans to poor people at lower cost than infor-
mal sources;
8For more detailed information, see Armend￿riz, Morduch, 2010.
8(b) to avoid exploitation of the poor due to the growth of informal
credit channels;
(c) to reach the "unbankable" that cannot be ￿nanced by tradi-
tional banks (because of the lack of collateral);
(d) to empower women both within the household (as decision
makers) and in society (through active economic and political par-
ticipation);
(e) to improve employment opportunities;
(f) to reduce poverty, increase growth and improve the living con-
ditions on sustainable perspectives.
As regards the last point, microcredit is gaining importance as
an e⁄ective tool of poverty alleviation. Impact evaluations aim
to investigate the role of credit access in terms of poverty reduc-
tion. Although some interesting research9 analyzes the e⁄ects of
microcredit programmes through a multidimensional poverty per-
spective10, ￿nancial outcomes remain the core matter in many rel-
evant impact studies. The lack of reliable data and the selection
problems connected with empirical evaluations represent a serious
complication to estimate microcredit consequences.
3. Econometric impact evaluations: selection bias and causal-
ity
Microcredit and the other micro￿nance services can a⁄ect individ-
uals and households in many di⁄erent ways. The ￿rst question
9Karlan, Zinman (2010) conducted an interesting study using an experimental
approach. They measure the impact of microcredit programmes (in Manila) also in
terms of subjective well-being using indicators such as life satisfaction, job satisfac-
tion, decision making power, optimism, etc. In addition, the authors investigated the
treatment e⁄ects on di⁄erent kinds of human capital.
As mentioned in the introduction, Karlan and Zinman (2008) created another inter-
esting experiment aiming to estimate impact e⁄ects of microcredit in South Africa.
In addition to ￿nancial impact measures (such as income and consumption), they
consider particular types of indices concerning health aspects (physical and mental
health index) and decision- making process, optimism, and position in the commu-
nity socio-economic ladder (this information comes from subjective perceptions of
sample households).
10Multidimensional poverty involves a group of deprivations that cannot be ade-
quately expressed as income insu¢ ciency. It refers to speci￿c composite measures,
such as the Human Poverty Index, that accounts for well-being indicators (like a
decent standard of living, a long and healthy life, knowledge). For more details, see
Tsui, 2002.
9that researchers have to ask is the following: what are we trying
to measure?
Concerning the impact of microcredit, we distinguish between two
di⁄erent e⁄ects:
(a) an income e⁄ect, that makes households wealthier and pushes
up consumption levels (it can also increase the demand for
children, health, children￿ s education, spare time);
(b) a substitution e⁄ect, which may counterbalance the income
e⁄ect. In fact, with increased female employment rates, hours
spent raising o⁄spring can be costlier in terms of foregone
income, driving birth levels down.
But increasing income and consumption are not the only metric of
judgement of microcredit impact.
As argued in a interesting book, Portfolios of the poor: How the
World￿ s Poor live on $2 a day (Collins, Morduch, Rutherford, and
Ruthven, 2009), the poor tend to use credit and savings not only
in order to smooth consumption, but also to cope with emergen-
cies like health problems and pay for expensive services such as
education, weddings, or funerals.
A lot of studies have looked at the experience of people who have
obtained microloans.
In order to have a clean estimate of evaluating impacts, the statis-
tical problem is to separate out the causal role of microcredit pro-
gram. In other words, it is necessary to gauge microcredit e⁄ects
eliminating the various reverse causation and selection biases.
As regards causality, researchers have to answer fundamental ques-
tions. For example, if they note that wealthier households have
larger loans, they have to ask if the loans enrich the households or
do richer households merely have less di¢ culty in accessing credit,
without a substantial increase in their productivity (Armend￿riz,
Morduch, 2010).
The challenge has been to identify an appropriate control group
for comparison; we have to ask if changements as new business,
new saving accounts, further education for children, etc. are due to
the program implementation or would have happened also without
microcredit introduction.
We can summarize the e⁄ect produced by a speci￿c treatment (T)
on a characteristic Y ( in order to understand whether and in
10what size the treatment may be considered a determinant factor
of Y) as follows11:
￿ = E(Y 1
i =Ti = 1) ￿ E(Y 0
i =Ti = 0)12 (1)
In this context, the causal e⁄ect is measured as the di⁄erence be-
tween the outcome that would be observed if unit i received the
treatment (E(Y 1
i =Ti = 1) ), and the outcome of receiving no treat-
ment of any kind (E(Y 0
i =Ti = 0)).
Econometric methods attempting to estimate how much of the
distinct outcomes between treatment and control groups attribut-
able to the program are a crucial tool in microcredit interventions,
especially in non-experimental settings. The question that every
evaluation seeks to solve is how would partecipants have done in
absence of intervention. As well argued in Holland (1986), the fun-
damental problem of causal inference concerns the impossibility of
evaluating, at the same time, treatment and no treatment, that
is Ti = 1 and Ti = 0; obviously, it is not possible observing the
results obtained on the same unit from the two di⁄erent situations
( E(Y 1
i =Ti = 1) and E(Y 0
i =Ti = 0)) in order to gauge the causal
e⁄ect of T on Y.
Di⁄erent counterfactual statistical estimation methodologies have
to be implemented on the basis of the speci￿c evaluation context.
In particular, we imagine to have to measure the causal impact
of microcredit on borrower income. The income level can be at-
tributed to di⁄erent kinds of sources: measurable attributes, for
example, like job, business, pension, age, education and experi-
ence, that are generally available.
But another category of personal characteristics is hard to measure,
for instance organizational ability, entrepreneurial skills, access to
valuable social networks. In this latter category, we include eco-
nomic shocks, and other types of casual events that could a⁄ect
household outcomes (Armend￿riz, Morduch, 2010).
In addition, a further set of attributes may be useful in order to
estimate microcredit impact, such as village size, or the existence
of scale economies related to speci￿c production (actually, this kind
of information is measurable but not gathered in surveys).
11See Du￿ o, Glennetster, and Kremer (2007)
12where "￿" represents the measure of the impact, E(Y1
i /Ti = 1) is the expected
value of the outcome variable observed after treatment on target units, while E( Y0
i
/Ti = 0) is the expected value after program implementation on control group.
11Estimating microcredit impact implies separating out its role from
the roles of all these di⁄erent attributes.
Bank o¢ cers work hard to screen potential ranges of customers,
and calculate the optimal locations for new branches; loans are
thought to attract the most gifted individuals, who choose to parte-
cipate or not in a microcredit program on the basis of personal and
strategic reasons (in particular, on the basis of perceived returns).
If target clients are wealthier and more productive than the non-
treated group, it could be attributed to the strategic placement of
the intervention, not to the active role of the micro￿nance institu-
tion in making these conditions. Hence, a high correlation between
microcredit participation and, for example, the variables age and
entrepreneurial ability is very probable.
In this context, if investigators manage measurable attributes (like
age), there are simple strategies in order to control for age-related
issues, but when there are typical unmeasurable attributes, such as
entrepreneurial ability researchers have to be cautious in making
comparisons between ex-ante and ex-post situations. The e⁄ect of
being a good microentrepreneur could incorrectly be interpreted
as an impact of program access (Armend￿riz, Morduch, 2010).
The counterfactual estimation (and, at the same time, the im-
pact estimation) can be a⁄ected by relevant problems, indicating
as threats to validity (Bartik and Bingham, 1995). Concerning
impact evaluations, the essential problem is the risk that the com-
parison between the target and the control group might be contam-
inated by factors which inhibit the untreated units from simulating
the without-intervention situation (selection bias).
The problem with comparing microcredit participants to non-participants
is that participants are self-selected and therefore not comparable
to the non-participants. Many microcredit clients already have
initial advantages respect to their neighbors.
In other words, program target units may have systematic di⁄er-
ences compared to the control group units, and these di⁄erences
could cause a biased evaluation of the intervention results.
Formally, if we consider equation (1) as a de￿nition of program
impact, and we subtract and add the term E(Y 0
i=Ti = 1) , we
obtain
￿ = E(Y 1
i =Ti = 1)￿E(Y 0
i =Ti = 1)￿E(Y 0
i =Ti = 0)+E(Y 0
i =Ti = 1)
￿ = E(Y 1
i ￿Y 0
i =Ti = 1)+E(Y 0
i =Ti = 1)￿E(Y 0
i =Ti = 0) (2)
12The term E(Y 1
i ￿Y 0
i =Ti = 1) is the treatment e⁄ect; the other term
E(Y 0
i =Ti = 1) ￿ E(Y 0
i =Ti = 0) represents the measure of selection
bias. It captures the di⁄erence in potential untreated outcomes be-
tween the target and the control groups. Treated units may have
had di⁄erent results on average even if they had not been treated.
The bias can move in two distinct directions: if, for instance, pro-
gram participants are more motivated in seeking goals, have high-
level entrepreneurial skills, or live in a richer geographic area, they
are more likely to achieve good results in terms of outcomes. In
this case, E(Y 0
i =Ti = 1) could be larger than E(Y 0
i =Ti = 0) . On
the other hand, if the treatment implementation arises in partic-
ularly disadvantged communities, with an higher rate of poverty,
the term E(Y 0
i =Ti = 1) would be smaller than E(Y 0
i =Ti = 0).
The crucial point is that in addition to any kind of treatment e⁄ect
there may be systematic di⁄erences between participants and non
participants (Du￿ o, Glennerster, Kremer, 2007).
Given that the term E(Y 0
i =Ti = 1) represents the expected out-
come for a borrower who received a loan, if he had not received
the loan, such term is not directly observable and we don￿ t as-
sess the size (and the sign) of the selection bias. Many empiri-
cal papers aim to identify in what cases selection bias does not
exist or ￿nd strategies to correct for it (Armend￿riz, Morduch,
2010).
4. Non-randomized approach
4.1 The estimation strategy
The main contributions of recent literature use innovative research
designs to overcome selection bias problems.
Following Coleman￿ s study (1999), we initially analyse a standard
empirical speci￿cation concerning the evaluation of program im-
pacts in the micro￿nance framework.
We start from the following speci￿cation:
Bij = Hij￿B + Lj￿B + ￿ij; (3)
Yij = Hij￿Y + Lj￿Y + Bij￿Y + ￿ij (4)
where Bij represents the amount borrowed from the village bank
by household i in village j, Hij is a vector of household attributes,
Lj is a vector of village characteristics and Yij is an outcome on
which measuring the impact. The parameters ￿B;￿B;￿Y; ￿Y; ￿Y
have to be estimated during the analysis. The error terms ￿ij and
13￿ij represent unmeasured household and village attributes that de-
termine microcredit participation and outcomes, respectively. The
parameter ￿Y measures the causal impact of a microcredit pro-
gram on the outcome Yij.
A crucial assumption in order to obtain unbiased econometric es-
timation of the parameters is that the error terms ￿ij and ￿ij are
uncorrelated. If this assumption is violated, the estimate of the
parameter of interest (￿Y) will be biased. This kind of correla-
tion can arise from (a) self-selection into the village bank and (b)
nonrandom program placement.
Concerning the ￿rst source of correlation, we consider a sample
of households selected only from communities with a local bank.
Some households will receive loans, while others will not partici-
pate in a microcredit program (on the basis of speci￿c eligibility
criteria). In this context, a correlation between ￿ij and ￿ij is al-
most certain; for example, if the more promising households are
selected to be borrowers , the unmeasured "entrepreneurial abil-
ity"might a⁄ect both the choice to become a program participant
and the impact estimation of the outcomes.
As regards the second source of correlation, we imagine to have an-
other common kind of sample made up of households from a village
with a local bank and randomly drawn households from communi-
ties without any village bank. If the placement of the local bank is
not random, it is more likely that ￿ij and ￿ij are correlated across
di⁄erent villages. To illustrate this situation, consider a simple
example: we suppose that an NGOs has to decide where placing
a village bank, on the basis of its own criteria. Presumably, the
institution will choose more entrepreneurial or better organized
communities, with a higher level of income, then the terms ￿ij and
￿ij will be correlated.
Mo¢ tt (1991) proposes three standard procedures used in the case
of correlation between ￿ij and ￿ij . The ￿rst concerns the instru-
mental variables approach. The identifying instruments might be
determinants of participating in the microcredit program, but not
determinants of the impact measure13.
The second strategy regards the introduction of panel data, in or-
der to take into account the pretreatment systematic di⁄erences in
outcome variables. But collecting a panel dataset is often di¢ cult
and costly.
13This will be covered in more detail later.
14Finally, the third method suggested by Mo¢ tt concerns assuming
an error distribution (usually a normal distribution) of the outcome
variable in absence of any kind of treatment. Then, the impact
of the micro￿nance intervention can be de￿ned by measuring the
deviations from normality of the variable of interest within the
treated units. This procedure involves three relevant problems:
(i) In many contexts, researchers haven￿ t su¢ cient information on
which to base assumptions about the error distribution;
(ii) The impact estimation is highly sensitive to the initial assump-
tions about the error distribution;
(iii) If analysts use, for instance, a censored regression (Tobit
model), the identi￿cation of the impact e⁄ects is sometimes im-
possible14.
14The Tobit model is appropriate when the dependent variable is censored at some
upper or lower bound because of the way the data are collected (Tobin, 1958, Mad-
dala, 1983). If we decide to censor at a lower bound, the empirical speci￿cation will
be:
Y￿
ij = Xij￿ + ￿ij (1)
Yij= Y￿
ij if Y￿
ij > 0 (2)
Yij=0 if Y￿
ij 6 0 (3)
where Y￿
ij is an unobserved continuous latent variable, Yij is the observed variable,
Xij represents the vector of the independent variables, ￿ij is the error term and ￿
is a vector of coe¢ cients. In addition, we assume that the error term is uncorre-
lated with the vector Xij and is independently and identically distributed. We can
generalize the model by introducing a known nonzero constant in equation (2) and
(3), in substitution of the threshold zero. Variations of the censoring point across
observations may happen (Winship, D.Mare, 1992).
OLS estimation of the ￿rst equation involves a selection bias problem. In fact, for
the set of information Yij > 0 , the above model implies:
Yij = Xij￿ + E
￿




= Xij￿ +E[￿ij j ￿ij > ￿Xij￿] + ￿ij: (4)
￿ij represents the di⁄erence between ￿ij and E
￿




with both terms. We note that E[￿ij j ￿ij > ￿Xij￿] in equation (4) is a function of
￿Xij￿ . The less the rate of censoring (that is ￿Xij￿ ), the greater is the conditional
expected value of the error term ￿ij . In this context, the OLS regression estimates
are biased and inconsistent because of the negative correlation between ￿Xij￿ and
￿ij. It is possible to construct a similar equation to the (4) for observations for
which Yij = 0 , generating a parallel analysis, but the inclusion of observation for
which Yij = 0 leads to analogous inconveniences. Starting from the analysis of
equation (4), Heckman (1979) shows how selection bias may be thought of as an
omitted variable bias. Speci￿cally, the term E
￿
￿ij j Y ￿
ij > 0
￿
can be interpreted as
an omitted variable correlated with Xij and that a⁄ects the outcome. Hence, biased
and inconsistent OLS estimates of the vector coe¢ cients (￿) hinge on its omission
(Winship, D.Mare, 1992).
154.2 The Coleman alternative speci￿cation
Coleman (1999) introduces a new approach consisting of using
information on future clients before the microcredit program is
started. The author exploits a particular way a microcredit in-
tervention was implemented in Northeast Thailand and suggests
an interesting way to address selection bias. The author gath-
ered data on 445 households in fourteen communities. Of these,
only eight had local banks beginning their activity at the start of
1995 .The other six did not, but local village banks will be set up
a year later. The "control" village bank households would have,
presumably, the same unobservable characteristics as the "treat-
ment" group of village bank members who had already received
the loans. Moreover, members and non-members of control and
treatment villages were surveyed.
Taking into account this survey design, Coleman(1999) estimates
the following regression equation15:
Yij = Hij￿Y + Lj￿Y + Mij￿ + Tij￿ + ￿ij (5)
This kind of approach allows a re￿nement of the di⁄erence in di⁄er-
ence method16. In particular, the dummy variables are introduced
to control for membership status and location of the intervention.
Speci￿cally, Mij represents a dummy variable equal to 1 if house-
hold i in village j self-selects into the microcredit program, and
0 otherwise. The term Tij is another dummy variable equal to
one if a self-selected member has already bene￿ted from the credit
interventions, and 0 otherwise. In this speci￿cation, the variables
15The author replaces equations (3) and (4) by an unique impact equation.
16Di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence designs use pre-intervention di⁄erences in outcomes be-
tween treatment and comparison group for control for unobserved heterogeneity be-
tween the groups, when data are available both before and after the intervention.
Consider YT
1 the potential outcome in the case of treatment (YC
1 corresponds to
the case of no treatment) in period 1, after the program implementation. Then, we
denote by Y T
0 the potential outcome if the subject is treated ( Y C
0 if the subject
is not treated) in period 0, before the program occurs.
Subjects belong to group T or group C, and the T group is treated in period 1


















































; this estimator provides an unbiased estimation
of the program impact (Du￿ o et al. 2007).
16of most interest are Mij and Tij. Coleman suggests that Mij can
be interpreted as a proxy for the unobservable attributes, which
leads subjects to self-select into the local bank. In other words,
Mij captures the unobserved variables that caused the correlation
between ￿ij and ￿ij across households. The variable Tij repre-
sents the number of months that the loans of the village bank were
available to members who have self-selected, which is exogenous
to the household. Following Coleman (1999), we argue that Mij
controls for selection bias in order to obtain a consistent estimate
of the causal treatment impact described by ￿ , the coe¢ cient of
Tij.
Coleman￿ s ￿ndings suggest that average treatment e⁄ects were
not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero after checking for endogenous
member selection and microcredit program placement. In addi-
tion, the author expands the estimation frame to distinguish be-
tween impacts on "rank-and-￿le members" and members of the
local bank committee (who are, usually, wealthier); the results
show that most program impacts were not statistically signi￿cant
for rank-and-￿le members, while there were some relevant impacts
for the committee members in terms of wealth accumulation.
However, the study needs to be put into the larger ￿nancial out-
look. Thai villagers are relatively wealthier than, for example,
Bangladeshi villagers, and have an easier access to credit, from
di⁄erent sources. In this analysis, the village banks￿loans may
be too small to produce relevant average di⁄erences in the welfare
of households. Coleman recognizes that one reason that wealth-
ier borrowers may have performed consistent impacts was because
they could manage larger loans.
4.3 Quasi experimental designs: Bangladesh studies
As mentioned above, a di⁄erent approach to overcome statistical
problems may be searching for an instrumental variable for mi-
crocredit program participation. This strategy allows analysts to
address some kinds of omitted variable bias, reverse causality and
problems arising from measurement error17. In practice, the instru-
mental variables method consists in ￿nding an additional variable
or set of variables that gives an explanation for levels of credit
received, but that has no correlation with the error term in the
regression framework. Then, the proxy variable formed on the
basis of the instrumental variable approach can be use to extract
17For a more detailed discussion about instrumental variables strategy see Greene,
2008, Part III.
17the causal impact of credit access. To ￿nd appropriate instru-
mental variables for microcredit is complex. But when we have
within-village variation in program access the basis of the eval-
uation methodology can be the eligibility rules (this is the ap-
proach using in some important studies of micro￿nance impact in
Bangladesh).
The most-famous studies about microcredit impacts on households
are based on a survey ￿elded in Bangladesh in the 1990s.
Pitt and Khander (1998) develop a framework for estimating im-
pact e⁄ects using the ￿rst round of data (1991-1992 cross-section).
They analyze surveys of 1,798 households in 89 villages randomly
drawn within 29 upazillas18 of Bangladesh. The starting point
is that the observations concerning the three programs evaluated
(Grameen Bank, BRAC, and the state-run Rural Development
Boards (RD-12)) all answer the same eligibility rule19. To focus
the attention on the poorest, all the three program formally de-
￿ned eligibility rule in terms of land ownership: households having
over half an acre of land are not allowed to borrow.
Following PK estimation set-up, the crucial feature of the estima-
tion problem is that the credit variables are potentially endogenous
and censored. Moreover, outcomes of interest as labour supply
and girl￿ s school enrolment are censored or binary. To estimate
impact parameters, PK use a limited-information maximum like-
lihood (LIML20) framework, that takes into account instrumental
variables and handles censoring. According to the kind of out-
come, the model will be as continuos and unbounded (household
consumption), Tobit (female and male labour supply per month,
female non-land assets), or Probit (school enrolment of boys or
girls).
The ￿rst model speci￿cation concerns the introduction of the credit
choice variables denoting if females and males in a household can
18The districts of Bangladesh are divided into subdistricts called upazillas.
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upazilas_of_Bangladesh).
19In this study, the lending model was solidarity group. Some of these groups were
all-male and more were all-female (none was mixed).
20The LIML estimator is based on a single equation under the assumption of nor-
mally distributed disturbances. It has the same asymptotic distribution as the 2SLS
estimator. The advantage of the LIML estimator is its invariance to the normaliza-
tion of the equation (see Greene, 2008, pp. 375-376 for the analytical demonstration).
In particular, Davidson and MacKinnon (2004) show that LIML can be used with
success when the sample size is reduced and the number of overidentifying restrictions
is large.
18borrow. Therefore, we have
cf = pfe
cm = pme:
Let pm and pm dummy variables denote if microcredit group of
men or women are e⁄ectively operating in a speci￿c village, while e
is a dummy that explains whether a household meets the eligibility
criteria of the micro￿nance programs. Let y0 denote the outcome.
Then, the model choice (Tobit or Probit) relies on the kind of
outcome y0. But since we restrict our attention on household con-
sumption, we will assume outcome is continuous and unbounded.
According to PK approach and subsequent contribution of the
Roodman-Morduch study, we consider the following problem:
y0 = yfm0￿ + x0￿0 + ￿0
y￿
f = x0￿f + "f if cf = 1
y￿









m ￿ Cg ￿ y￿
m
(￿0;￿f;￿m)0 ￿ N (0;￿):
where yf and ym are the total borrowings of all women and all men
household members. Let yfm =(yf1;yf2;yf3;ym1;ym2;ym3)0denotes
the six credit variables disaggregated by program and gender; x
is a vector of exogenous controls, C represents the credit censor-
ing level, ￿ is a 3￿3 positive de￿nite symmetric matrix, and 1fg
indicates a dummy variable.
The above econometric model presents some unusual features. First,
as suggested by Roodman and Morduch (2009), "Super￿cially,
there appear to be no excluded instruments. Meanwhile, the credit
equations￿samples are restricted, which means that the number of
equations in the model varies by observation."21 Second, the out-
come equation contains six di⁄erent endogenous credit variables
but in the model there are only two instrumental equations ( for y￿
f
and y￿
m ). Apart from these unusual features, the key assumption
behind the model is similar to a traditional two-stage instrumen-
tal variable set-up. Speci￿cally, they estimate the following two
equations by using LIML set-up:
y￿
f = cfx0￿f + C + ￿f
21See also Wilde (2000) for a more advanced discussion.
19y￿
m = cmx0￿m + C + ￿m (7)
In this speci￿c setting, PK e⁄ectively instrument for the borrowing
variable creating interactions between the credit choice dummies
and the exogenous variables included in the model. The PK ex-
ogenous variables are: age, sex, education of the household head,
other household characteristics, a set of village characteristics and
individual characteristics ( in the case of regression on individual-
level data). In addition, the authors included also the constant
terms, cf and cm , which are instruments themselves.
The PK models for distinct outcomes have several characteristics.
First, they are conditional (i.e., it means that their speci￿cs, such
as number of equations, vary by observation, being conditional
on the data). Second, they are recursive in the sense that the
speci￿cations contain plain stages and do not model any kind of
simultaneous causation. Moreover, as argued in Roodman (2009),
the observed yf and ym appear in the equation (y0); this implies
that they are also fully observed. Finally, the models combine
equations that show di⁄erent types of censoring (mixed process)22.
An important issue in this model concerns spherical errors. Since
heteroskedasticity can make Tobit-type models inconsistent, the
critical point is how much the previous assumption can be relaxed.
In PK￿ s carefully study homoskedasticity is implicitly assumed.
Speci￿cally, the authors assume identically but not independently
distributed errors. Starting from assumptions on cf and cm, the
identi￿cation framework is based on the exogeneity (after condi-
tioning on controls) of this constant terms. In other words, the
factors driving credit choice (i.e., the formation of credit groups
by village and gender, and the eventual eligibility of individual
households) must be exogenous. PK￿ s approach does not suggest
valid arguments in support of the exogeneity of the ￿rst factor. As
regards the second (landholdings), they argue:
"Market turnover of land is well known to be low in South Asia.
The absence of an active land market is the rationale given for the
treatment of landownership as an exogenous regressor in almost all
the empirical work on household behaviour in South Asia"23
But this seems to describe a case in which landholdings is external
to the model and not exogenous (Heckman, 2000). The exogeneity
notion is di⁄erent: it requires that landholdings are related to
22For more details, see Roodman (2009).
23From Pitt and Khander (1998), p.970.
20outcomes only through microcredit after linearly conditioning on
controls24.
Concerning the two PK identifying assumptions , Morduch (1998)
remarks relevant questions. First, PK acknowledge that unob-
served factors might in￿ uence both group formation and outcomes,
generating endogeneity. Their strategy consists of including village
dummies to control for any factors at the community-level. The
Morduch￿ s criticism is about sub-village e⁄ects (i.e., the village
e⁄ects are not ￿xed within villages). For instance, we imagine a
local community in which eligible households are not very poor.
Then, in a similar context, group formation might be more likely
and outcomes systematically better. In his following study, Pitt
(1999) introduces interaction terms between landholdings and all
the x variables to PK￿ s instrument framework to strengthen their
￿ndings. Second, in the PK data land markets are active and there
exists substantial endogenous mistargeting. In other words, 203 of
the 905 borrowing households in the 1991-92 sample owned more
than 0.5 acres before the microcredit intervention. Microlenders
were not following the eligibility criteria strictly so that some of the
over-half-acre households that received the loans may have been
met with an alternative eligibility rule (as discussed in PK (1998),
footnote 16: "The quasi-experimental identi￿cation strategy used
here is an example of the regression discontinuity design"). Pitt
(1999) replies to Morduch￿ s criticisms pointing out that identi￿-
cation with LIML does not require the eligibility rule be perfectly
respected but it merely drives an exogenous component of variation
in borrowing.
With regard to impact results, PK found that "annual household
consumption expenditure increases 18 taka for every 100 addi-
tional taka borrowed by women...compared to 11 taka for men."
In addition, they found that lending to female reduces the use
of contraception and has a positive impact on schooling of boys
(as regards Grameen Bank and RD-12, while women participation
only in Grameen Bank has a positive e⁄ect on schooling of girls).
24According to Merriam-Webster￿ s dictionary, exogenous means caused by factors
or an agent from outside the organism or system. But the consistency of IV estimator
implies that the instrument be orthogonal to the error term, which is not involved
by the Merriam-Webster de￿nition (Leamer, 1985). Heckmann (2000) suggests the
term external for the Merriam-Webster de￿nition. Its use concerns variables whose
values are not set or caused by the variables in the model. Therefore, it is more
correct keeping exogenous for the orthogonality condition that is required to obtain
consistent estimation in IV context.
21These ￿ndings reinforce two fundamental concepts about microcre-
dit: ￿rst, its reliability as instrument to alleviate poverty, second
the important role of women credit.
We now focus our attention on Morduch￿ s study (1998). He uses
an estimation strategy analogous to PK￿ s, but simpler and less ef-
￿cient. As a ￿rst step, he performs simple di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence
estimates, then adds controls. Despite PK￿ s study, Morduch ￿nds
no sharp evidence for strong impacts of microcredit on household
consumption. However, he ￿nds some evidence that microcredit
helps households to diversify income ￿ ows so that consumption
volatility is less pronounced across seasons. Moreover, the results
hinge on the assumption that the village dummies totally capture
all critical aspects about the communities that might a⁄ect the
microlender￿ s decisions concerning the program placement. In this
analysis the village dummy variables only control for unobserv-
able attributes that in￿ uence all households in a village identically
and linearly25. In addition, Morduch ￿nds weaker evidence that
households with credit access tend to manage actively not only
their spending, but also their labour income. He ￿nally concludes
(without any direct evidence) that the ability to smooth income
over the year drives smoother within-year consumption levels.
The above empirical contributions arise from the analysis of the
￿rst round of data (1991-1992)26. But exhaustive impact studies
using a single cross-section requires some important assumptions.
These studies are based on intensive use of statistical methods
to overcome the limitations of the data set. There are relevant
questions about the validity of the critical assumptions that hold
up the statistical framework (Roodman and Morduch, 2009).
Khander (2005) points out that the availability of panel data helps
to eliminate one potential source of bias in the PK and Morduch
cross-section studies. This source concerns unobserved but ￿xed
attributes simultaneously in￿ uencing microcredit borrowing and
other outcomes of interest. In his study, Khander analyzes three
di⁄erent outcomes: household food consumption, non-food con-
25This aspect will be strongly criticized by Roodman and Morduch (2009).
26Concerning the process of data collection, during the years 1991 and 1992 the
World Bank and the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies surveyed nearly
1,800 households in 87 villages in Bangladesh. Of these, 15 were not served by mi-
crolenders. Then, in 1998 and 1999, researchers returned to analyse the same sample.
The only change is that all villages were served by micro￿nance services. Because
of the attrition, 1,638 were the households interviewed in both rounds (Armend￿riz,
Morduch, 2010).
22sumption and total consumption. Despite PK, he includes house-
holds owing more than 5 acres.
Following Khander￿ s carefully study, we now examine in detail the
poverty e⁄ects of microcredit intervention. In his analysis, the
author distinguishes between moderately poor and extremely poor
(as argued in Khander, 1998, he de￿nes moderate poverty as house-
hold consumption level below 5,270 taka/person/year and extreme
poverty as 80% of that, 3,330 taka/person/year)27.
Table 1 contains data fromBangladesh context in Khander(2005).
We can note, from this survey, that in program villages microcre-
dit participants had relevant declines in poverty rates (in terms
of moderate poverty). Concerning the voice "All program partic-
ipants", we can see a decrease from a rate of about 90 percent
in the ￿rst period to about 70 percent in the second round of
data, approximately a 20 percentage point decline. But for el-
igible households that did not participate in credit programmes
(in the period 1991/92) the falling in terms of poverty rate was
19.2 percentage points, as nontarget nonparticipants (19 percent).
At this point, the question is: did microcredit intervention play
a role in this process? Pessimists may answer that the decline
of average poverty incidence for program participants might have
happened even without intervention. On the other hand, optimists
think that the net impact of programmes have been substantial,
involving also nonparticipants. In other words, they argue that
the spillover e⁄ect could explain the general improvement in areas
with programs. Comparing the results for program areas to results
for villages without intervention in 1991/1992, we can note a sim-
ilar trend: poverty rates decreased by around 19 to 20 percentage
points (only target nonparticipants had a poverty reduction of 4.5
percentage points).
In his conclusions, Khander argues that microcredit contributed to
approximately one third to one half of these poverty contractions.
Speci￿cally, Khander asserts that lending 100 taka to a female
leads to a growth in household consumption by around 8 taka
annually. Moreover, he suggests that the impact of micro￿nance
intervention is stronger for extreme poverty than moderate poverty,
and microcredit e⁄ects are more relevant for women borrowing
than for men borrowing.
27This classi￿cation is based on the poverty line criterion.
234.4 The Roodman-Morduch revisitation.
The Roodman-Morduch approach to PK￿ s analysis a¢ rms, as Mor-
duch (1998), that the baseline assumptions used in the study do
not hold. Morduch (1999) does not ￿nd evidence of consumption
impacts in the 1991/1992 data and criticizes the identifying as-
sumptions of the PK￿ s framework. On the other hand, he suggests
that microcredit decreases consumption volatility. In their replica-
tion, Roodman and Morduch (2009) use the same methods to the
same data as in PK. Applying two-stages least-squares (2SLS) re-
gression, they contest the positive results obtained in the previous
study. Concerning the PK ￿ndings, Roodman-Morduch achieve
opposite (in sign) results. On the basis of speci￿c tests , they
argue that instrumentation strategy is failing. Reverse or omitted-
variable causation drives the ￿nal outcomes, and the endogenous
links between credit and consumption varies by subsample ( i.e.,
borrower sex). It can explain the di⁄erences in terms of gender
impact. But they do not conclude that microcredit does not a⁄ect
the lives of poor borrowers; rather, they suggest that the statistical
setting is not due to the task.
Roodman and Morduch ￿ndings about Khander￿ s analysis reduce
the con￿dence that the key identifying assumptions for causal infer-
ence e⁄ectively hold in a similar context. In particular, they doubt
that the Khander￿ s assertion concerning the relevant impact of mi-
crocredit services in reducing extreme poverty could arise from a
direct estimation. The critical point is that the introduction of
the panel framework does not seem to overcome the problem of
the lack of clearly exogenous variations in the use of microcredit.
The distinction between moderately poor and extremely poor con-
ducted by the author is based on estimated baseline poverty levels.
Then he compares changes in consumption (about the two kinds
of poor households) using regression coe¢ cients that would have
sense only if all the households have similar net impacts.
All the three studies (Pitt-Khander 1998, Morduch 1998, Khander
2005) tend to reinforce the general positive idea about microcre-
dit. According to PK (1998) and Khander (2005), microloans can
reduce poverty, especially for women. In addition, Morduch (1998)
suggests that small-size credits help households to attenuate con-
sumption variability across the seasons. Roodman and Morduch
(2009) do not contradict these considerations, but highlight the
absence of decisive statistical evidence in support of these studies.
245. Randomized approach
5.1 Randomization as potential solution of selection bias: analyti-
cal foundations.
As discussed in section 3, selection bias represents a relevant prob-
lem in order to obtain a clean estimation of the microcredit pro-
gram impact.
The aim, in this particular context, is to gauge the net e⁄ect of
credit access on the revenue of a borrower. The causal impact, that
is the term E(Y 1
i ￿ Y 0
i =Ti = 1) , is not observable but as argued
in Du￿ o et. al. (2007) is "logically well de￿ned".
Randomized experiments allow to manage selection bias problems
through a random assignment of the program to the treatment and
comparison groups.
How does this methodology function in practice?
First, a sample of N individuals, or households, is selected from
a population of interest28; second, the initial sample is randomly
divided into two distinct subgroups: treatment and comparison or
control groups.
The target units are exposed to the "treatment" (i.e. they receive
the loan), while the non-target units aren￿ t. Then researchers ob-
serve the outcome Y, and compared the results for both di⁄erent
subgroups.
As argued in section 3, we can estimate the average program im-
pact as follows:
￿ = E(Y 1
i =Ti = 1) ￿ E(Y 0
i =Ti = 0) (8)
The advantage in adopting this approach is that the two groups
are expected to be identical before the microcredit program, be-
cause of their random selection. The only di⁄erence is due to the
exposure of the treatment. This implies that the selection bias
term E(Y 0
i =Ti = 1) ￿ E(Y 0
i =Ti = 0) is equal to zero.The term in
question describes how both participant group and control group
would have performed if nobody had had access to credit. More-
over, if the outcomes of a subject are unrelated to the treatment
of the other individuals29, we obtain
28It￿ s important to highlight that the population of interest can￿ t be randomly
drawn from the whole population, but could be selected on the basis of observable
attributes (Du￿ o et al. 2007).
29See Angrist, Imbens, Rubin (1996)
25E(Y 1
i =Ti = 1)￿E(Y 0
i =Ti = 0) = E(Y 1
i ￿Y 0




If randomization has been completed with success, experimental
approaches can provide a valuable instrument in order to overcome
selection bias problems.
In the opposite case, we can meet with problems. For instance,
the individuals that apply for loans successfully may have more
business ability, organizational skills and entrepreneurial experi-
ence than subjects that don￿ t apply for a microcredit program.
Besides, the choice of the location from a micro￿nance institution
may be addressed to the villages with good life and economic con-
ditions respect to other more disadvantaged sites.
Many estimation problems concern the cases of "non-random" at-
trition (the less promising clients are the ￿rst to drop out of the
program) and contamination (for instance, a new competitor starts
his ￿nancial activity during the study period).
Generally, the bias of impact estimation is upward. But there
are also particular forms of selection bias, such as contamination,
which may lead to downward biases; performing a correct random-
ization implying that E(Y 0
i =Ti = 1) = E(Y 0
i =Ti = 0):30
5.2 Randomization in microcredit impact evaluations: sample-size
and the power of experiments.
In general, two particular factors a⁄ect the success of an exper-
iment: statistical power and the role of spillovers (Armend￿riz,
Morduch, 2010).
Du￿ o et al. (2007) suggest the basic principles of power calcu-
lation31, starting from a simple regression frame. The estimate
of the average impact is the OLS coe¢ cient of ￿ in the following
regression:
Yi = ￿ + ￿T + ￿i (10)
Following Bloom￿ s (1995) approach, we assume that only a possible
treatment exists, and that a speci￿c proportion P of the sample
receives the treatment in question. Since we suppose that each
30As much as discussed above depends on the properties of expectations of linear
operators (average impact).
As argued in Armend￿riz, Morduch (2010, p. 296): "But the basic set-up does not
permit us to say anything about the medians and very little about the distributional
features of impacts. And we need to be careful in analyzing data on the impacts for
particular subgroups in a population."
31See also Bloom (1995).
26unit was randomly sampled from an identical population, the ob-
servations can be considered to be identical independent distributed
(i.i.d.), with variance ￿2:






Now, we focus our attention on testing the hypothesis H0 , that is
the impact of the treatment is equal to zero against the alternative
hypothesis, H1 , that it is not.
The signi￿cance level related to a speci￿c test describes the likeli-
hood of rejecting the null hypothesis when it￿ s true.
Figure 1: Statistical Power
Figure 1 draws two distinct bell shaped curves: on the left there
is the distribution of ^ ￿ under the null hypothesis of absence of
impact H0 = 0, on the right the distribution of ^ ￿ if the true e⁄ect
is e⁄ectively ￿:
In the ￿rst speci￿cation, If ^ ￿ falls to the right of the critical value,
for a determinate level of signi￿cance, the hypothesis H0 = 0 will
be rejected; formally, it is true if
j ^ ￿ j> ta ￿ SE^ ￿ (12)
where ta hinges on the signi￿cance level and it derives from a stan-
dard t-distribution.
In the second case, in order to evaluate the power of the test for
a true impact size ￿ we take into account the part of the area
under this curve which is to the right of the critical level ta. In
other words, it corresponds to the probability of rejecting the null
hypothesis when it￿ s e⁄ectively false.
27The achievement of a power k implies the following condition:





Du￿ o et al. (2007) consider the issue of power as the "minimum
detectable e⁄ect size" for a given statistical power (k), signi￿cance
level (a), sample size (N), and set of individuals that belong to
the treatment group (P). It can be given by







where the term t1￿k represents the level of statistical power, ta captures
the con￿dence level, P includes the portion of sample that received
the program, ￿2 is the variance of the impact and, ￿nally, N is the
total size of the sample.
From equation (14), we note a trade-o⁄ between statistical power
and sample size. In fact, when N increases, the minimum de-
tectable e⁄ect size decreases, and vice versa. Power calculation
describes the linkage between impact size and sample size, with
typical statistical con￿dence levels (5 percent, 10 percent, 20 per-
cent). But in general the e⁄ect size is not known before starting
with the intervention. Many di⁄erent studies have developed po-
tential solutions to overcome such problems: the ￿rst practical
approach consists in making predictions on the basis of previous
researches, the second concerns the introduction of a small pilot
study.34
Cohen (1988), for instance, express the impact size in terms of
standard deviations from the mean of the outcome; he suggests, in
his analysis, that an impact of 0.2 standard deviation is negligible,
0.5 is intermediate, and 0.8 is relevant. Clearly, these values are
indicative and have to be considered in each speci￿c context.
Equation (14) also provides useful advice concerning the division
of the sample between treated and non-treated units. We assume,
for example, that there is a single treatment, and the most relevant
cost of the study is data collection. It follows that an equal distrib-
ution between treatment and control group is an optimal allocation
(in this case, the equation above is minimized at P=0.5).
But if program implementation is costly and the data are easily
available for both the groups ( the data collection process isn￿ t ex-
32The term t1￿k is simply given by a t-table.
33It refers to a single sided test. If we introduce a two-sided test, the term ta will
be substituted by ta=2:
34For a more advanced discussion, see Du￿ o et al. (2007, pp 22-24).
28pensive), the optimal division will require a larger control group.
Speci￿cally, in order to obtain the optimal proportion of treated














sub Ncc + NPct ￿ B
where N is the total sample size, cc represents the unit cost per
comparison subject, and ct is the unit cost for treatment subject.





As argued in Du￿ o et al. (2007), "the ratio of subjects in the
treatment group to those in the comparison should be proportional
to the inverse of the square root of their costs."
The above setting can be applied to sample size calculations when
there are multiple treatment.35
The level of randomization represents a crucial matter for the sam-
ple size. Many experimental designs involve randomization over
groups rather than single individuals. For example, PROGRESA36
program used the village as the unit of randomization, even if sin-
gle individual data were available for statistical evaluation.
In similar contexts, we have to consider that the error term may
not be independent across single individuals. If the program par-
ticipants in a group have some attributes in common, information
about single units will cause weak variations in the ￿nal result
compared to the case of individual-level randomization. Since bor-
rowers of the same group can be subject to common shocks, a
correlation between outcomes is very likely, and leads to a wrong
interpretation of the program impact.37
The key issue is to compare the proportion of the outcome vari-
ance coming from the group impact and the proportion coming
from individual impact: if the ￿rst value is higher, also the sample
needs to be bigger, or, alternatively, the e⁄ective size necessary for
detection.
35See Bloom (1995).
36PROGRESA (Programa de Educaci￿n, Salud y Alimentaci￿n) is an anti-poverty
program implemented in Mexico in the late 1990s (for more information, see
http://www.ifpri.org/dataset/mexico-evaluation-progresa)
37For an analytical treatment, see Bloom (2005)
29One important di¢ culty encountered when we operate in the mi-
cro￿nance context is that some experimental designs only encour-
age subjects to participate in a speci￿c credit program (treatment)
so that "eligible" people can accept or refuse the invitation. At the
same time, people in the control group may take up the treatment
even if they are not directly encouraged (Armend￿riz, Morduch,
2010).
Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006) encouraged a randomly selected
group of people to sign up a new savings account. In this frame-
work, the element of randomness was the invitation; this implies
that the e⁄ects of the program must be evaluated comparing in-
vited and non-invited subjects. Clearly, it follows that not all
invited individuals accepted the proposal. Since the impact mea-
sured at the invitation level is reduced, a bigger sample size is
required.
Finally, a strati￿cation (or block) of the sample can be introduced
in order to improve estimate precision. Stratifying involves divid-
ing the sample into subgroups that have similar values of particular
observable characteristics. Then, the randomization is conducted
for each single block (subgroup) separately.
While the randomization procedure ensures that treatment and
comparison groups will be similar in terms of expectation, strati￿-
cation process is used in order to ensure that the assignment to a
speci￿c group (treatment or control group) is random in practice,
along observable dimensions of the strati￿cation.
A strati￿ed design allows us to gauge the impact of the program
for each subgroups separately using statistical methods. Since each
block tends to be more homogeneous compared to the entire sam-
ple, a little change in the outcome levels can be found out with
the same sample size. The relevant consequence is that a smaller
total sample is needed38.
5.3 Spillover e⁄ects
Experimental designs can make externalities such that non treated
individuals are a⁄ected by the intervention. Moreover, there are
spillovers also when an individual transfers from the treatment
group to the comparison group, or vice-versa.
Following Du￿ o et al. (2007), we consider a simple case in which a
microcredit program is randomly attributed across a population of
38For a more advanced discussion, see Imbens, King, and Ridder (2006).
30individuals. The estimate of the intervention is ￿ = E(Y 1
i =Ti =
1) ￿ E(Y 0
i =Ti = 0); if we interpret this di⁄erence as the impact
of the treatment, "the potential outcomes for each individual are
independent of his treatment status, as well as the treatment group
status of any other individual.39"
If the previous condition is violated, the term ^ E(Y 0
i =Ti = 0)40 in
the sample does not correspond to E(Y 0
i =Ti = 0) in the popula-
tion, because the sample contains at the same time treated and
non treated units. This implies that the potential outcome for
each subject and the intention-to-treat estimate (￿) hinge on the
entire set of allocations to participants and non participants on
the program. If we assume, for instance, that the externalities on
untarget individuals are positive, the estimate of the term ￿ will
be smaller than it would have been in absence of externalities.
If the spillover e⁄ects become relevant in the impact study, re-
searchers can design experiments ad hoc, in order to identify their
size and power41.
In the micro￿nance framework, spillovers can happen when, for
example, a target individual receiving funds divides part of the
money with a friend of the comparison group, or when a micro-
credit client participating in business training program shares the
new knowledge with another borrower who wasn￿ t selected for the
training activity.
Externalities a⁄ect the experimental design at distinct levels. Indi-
vidual switching between groups is not a random process, and the
identi￿cation of the program e⁄ects depends on the randomness
of the treatment assignment. Therefore, if an individual switches
from treatment to comparison group, a problem of selection bias
in the impact estimation reappears. As regards spillovers due to
sharing bene￿ts concerning only the treated status, it may reduce
(or enlarge) the observable e⁄ects of the program implementation.
39This is the standard unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA): we assume that
the potential outcomes for each individual are unrelated to the participation status
of other subjects (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin, 1996).
40We estimate the average treatment impact as the di⁄erence in empirical means
of Y between the two distinct groups as follows
^ ￿ = ^ E(Y 1
i =Ti = 1) ￿ ^ E(Y 0
i =Ti = 0)
where the term ^ E describes the sample average. Hence, as the sample size grows,
the previous di⁄erence tends to
￿ = E(Y 1
i =Ti = 1) ￿ E(Y 0
i =Ti = 0)
(Du￿ o et. al., 2007).
41For a more advanced discussion, see Du￿ o et. al. (2007), pp. 56-58.
31In similar contexts, a bigger sample is needed. Another potential
solution concerns randomizing at the group level rather than the
individual level.
When a micro￿nance istitution lends funds to a group of individu-
als (group lending strategy), spillover e⁄ects can a⁄ect the impact
estimation. Since this procedure involves a random assignment of
the status of program participation within the group, it is likely
that resentment, confusion and distrust emerge from the group
members and produce biased impact evaluations.
5.4 Hawthorne and John Henry e⁄ects
Another interesting aspect involving impact evaluations is that
the evaluation itself may lead to changes in treatment and control
groups behaviour.
Speci￿cally, behaviour changes among the target units are called
Hawthorne E⁄ects42, while behaviour changes among the untarget
units are called John Henry e⁄ects43.
In microcredit programs, the treated units might appreciate re-
ceiving the loan and be aware of being observed, which may lead
them to modify their behaviour during the experiment. On the
other hand, the control units may alter their behaviour because
of their resentment towards the program participants, and decide
to compete with those receiving the loan (for instance, working
harder in order to show their abilities) or on the contrary, slack
o⁄.
One way to disentangle these e⁄ects from the program impacts is
suggested by Du￿ o and Hanna (2006)44. The authors continued
to monitor the e⁄ects of the program implementation after the
duration of the experiment. If the results obtained in absence of
any kind of experiment are similar to the outcomes at the beginning
of the evaluation period, the results are not a⁄ected by Hawthorne
e⁄ects.
42The term was coined by H. A. Landsberger (1950), when examining older ex-
periments from the period 1924-1932 at the Hawthorne Works (a Western Electric
Company in Chicago).
During a study comissioned in order to evaluate the e⁄ect of work conditions on
worker productivity, it was suggested that workers tend to increase their production
due to the motivational e⁄ect of being observed.
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hawthorne_e⁄ect)
43The term John Henry e⁄ects comes from the story of John Henry trying to lay
railroad track faster than the machine (Du￿ o et. al., 2007).
44For more information concerning the program, see the article "Monitoring Works:
Getting teachers to come to school" (Du￿ o, Hanna, 2006).
32Experimental designs can also be created in order to disentangle
Hawthorne or John Henry e⁄ects. For example, in Ashraf, Karlan,
and Yin￿ s study (2006), the authors were concerned about the role
of the marketer visits (in the SEED program45) to the homes of
clients, emphasizing the importance of savings. They suggested
that these kind of relationships may persuade individuals to im-
prove their performances.
To overcome this inconvenience, they added a further treatment
group to which they o⁄ered regular savings accounts. In other
words, in addition to the clients assigned to the SEED program,
a part of the comparison group was selected for the pure control
group, while the other part was assigned to a third group, called the
"marketing treatment" group. The units of this group receive the
same marketing campaign as the SEED clients, with an exclusive
di⁄erence: the marketing activity was limited to traditional savings
products of the micro￿nance institution.
Comparing savings performances of the SEED￿ s participants with
the results of the "marketing treatment " clients, Ashraf et al.
isolated the direct e⁄ect produced by the SEED program from the
e⁄ect of the marketing activity.
5.5 Randomization limits
A ￿rst limit of a randomized approach arises from the estimate of
an average impact of the intervention. It o⁄ers little information
about the distribution of the e⁄ects, and nothing concerning the
median impact. One method to improve the learning process about
the distribution of impacts can be strati￿cation.
As discussed above, the introduction of impact estimations for sub-
groups (from the start of the experiment) may help avoid relevant
risks, such as "data mining" and the ￿nding of spurious results.
The implementation of a strati￿cation method, both in random-
ized and non-randomized approaches, allows us to specify in ad-
vance which subgroups (for instance, men and women, richer and
poorer clients, young and aged people) and which hypotheses may
be signi￿cant, thus restricting the analysis to these.
45The SEED is a commitment savings product (Save, Earn, Enjoy deposits) ac-
count designed for a small rural bank in the Philippines. This kind of account requires
that individuals undergo restrictions in withdrawing their funds until they reach a
goal date, or that a given amount of money was deposited. (Ashraf, Karlan, and
Yin, 2006).
33Another relevant limitation of randomized experiments concerns
the di¢ culty in generalising the ￿ndings to other settings, that are
di⁄erent from the original one. In short, they can have a high inter-
nal level of validity, but not an external one. Hence, analysts that
use this approach have to replicate a speci￿c experiment before
reaching general conclusions.
Non-randomized studies usually use data coming from large geo-
graphical areas, with diversi￿ed populations and their ￿ndings are
applicable to a wider range of di⁄erent contexts. But often these
methods are less e¢ cient in terms of internal validity.
Randomized experiments are designed carefully, and their imple-
mentation is planned closely, but extension to a large scale can
yield di⁄erent results. Pilot studies46 can be used to evaluate if a
policy produces relevant impacts on a small scale, and then even-
tually to procede with the implementation on a wide scale.
When a randomized experiment is implemented, the initial random
assignment of the treatment must be maintained during the entire
period of analysis. The limits here are due to attrition and con-
tamination. The ￿rst problem (attrition bias) is not predictable
and can overestimate or underestimate the impact of intervention.
Contamination may happen if, for example, a new micro￿nance in-
stitution starts working with a comparison group, giving ￿nancial
services to the people that do not receive any kind of treatment.
Finally, randomized approaches impose their logic on the selection
of program participants. This implies that not the entire popu-
lation will receive the treatment, and the choice of who obtains
the loan cannot be made based on fairness assumptions (such as
"those who need it most"). Several nongovernment organizations
may be unwilling to accept this statistical method. (Armend￿riz,
Morduch, 2010).
6. Experimental versus Non-experimental: a comparison
Recently, a growing amount of literature has tried to use random-
ized experiments to validate non-experimental methods.
Lalonde (1986) suggests that many statistical procedures used in
impact evaluations did not lead to precise estimates and often these
di⁄er substantially from experimental results. Glazerman, Levy,
46Pilot study represents the phase before the program is scaled up. This is an
occasion for researchers to assess the e⁄ectiveness of the program and a chance to
improve the experimental design. (Du￿ o et al., 2007)
34and Myers (2003) compared experimental and non-experimental
approaches in di⁄erent ￿elds: welfare, job training and employ-
ment service programs in the US. They found, by the examination
of twelve distinct design replication studies, that retrospective es-
timators frequently lead to outcomes strongly di⁄erent from ran-
domized evaluation. In addition, the bias can be signi￿cant47.
Interestingly, Cook, Shadish, and Wong (2006) compare random-
ized and non-randomized studies, especially in educational set-
tings. They note that the results coming from the two di⁄erent
approaches are similar when analysts use a regression discontinuity
or "interrupted time series" (as non-experimental strategy). The
authors conclude that quasi-experimental designs (for instance re-
gression discontinuity) might generate clean impact estimates as a
well-done experimental evaluation.
Diaz and Hanna (2006) focus on PROGRESA, an anti-poverty
program implemented in Mexico. Speci￿cally, they compare esti-
mates from an experimental design with those obtained by propen-
sity score matching, and conclude that the second strategy can be
valid, when a consistent number of control variables is available.
Du￿ o, Kremer, and Robinson (2006) conducted an interesting study
in which they compared experimental and non-experimental esti-
mates of peer e⁄ects over fertilizer adoption in Kenya. They found
that there is a correlation between an individual￿ s decision and
the decisions of other contacts, probably due to the sharing of the
same environment. In this context, randomization ensured exoge-
nous variations in the likelihood that some members of a speci￿c
network adopted the new technology. The study shows substan-
tially di⁄erent results from the non-experimental framework; in
particular, the authors highlight no evidence of learning e⁄ect.
Comparative studies can be useful in order to assess the existence
and the size of biases in retrospective impact evaluations, providing
a valuable guidance to address estimation problems.
Clearly, it is important that retrospective evaluations are con-
ducted before the results of experimental approach are available, in
order to avoid selection of plausible comparison groups and meth-
ods with the intention of matching experimental estimates (Du￿ o
et al., 2007).
47For a more complete discussion, see Du￿ o et al. (2007).
357. Summary and Conclusions
Is microcredit really moving people out of poverty? This is the
crucial question that researchers are attempting to solve. But, as
discussed above, completing reliable impact evaluations is often
di¢ cult, as well as interpreting the results obtained.
Impact evaluations play a crucial role in allowing micro￿nance in-
stitutions to reliably assess the e⁄ectiveness of their operations
on poverty reduction and for investors to learn about the more
promising types of programmes to implement. But the lack of
valuable studies explains the di¢ culty in evaluating interventions
in which di⁄erent clients use ￿nancial services with several degrees
of intensity and participation is voluntary.
To sum up, it is possible to highlight some important issues con-
cerning the impact evaluations framework.
(i) Microlenders tend to carefully select communities and villages in
which to o⁄er their services, and target citizens to whom to lend.
Therefore microcredit programmes can be implemented in those
areas which have more business opportunities, or have good-level
infrastructures (highways, markets, large towns). Such criteria to
select places for intervention lead to biased estimation of program
impact.
(ii) Self-selection of program participant represents another im-
portant source of bias. Since it is probable that households with
greater entrepreneurial spirit and organizational skills are more
likely to join the microcredit program, this can produce biases in
estimating the e⁄ects of the program (speci￿cally, when these kinds
of unobservable attributes are correlated with obtaining credit).
(iii) The standard methods applied in microcredit impact evalua-
tions tend to consider the intervention as a homogeneous process,
that produces a steady in￿ uence on outcome variables like con-
sumption, income or poverty. In practice, the causal process is
more complicated. For instance, there might be hidden relation-
ships between the selected exogenous and endogenous variable, or
externalities, which may obscure the causation linkage.
Recently, a set of interesting impact evaluations have incorporated
experimental designs into the program implementation to achieve
reliable estimates of the impact net e⁄ects. In my opinion it rep-
resents a possible strategy to follow, keeping in mind that both
approaches have to be made with care.
36If we focus our attention on the hundreds of millions of micro￿-
nance clients, they demonstrate how important microcredit is in
their lives by a behavioural mechanism called "voting with their
feet". According to Rosenberg (2010), the micro￿nance experi-
ence in three decades shows that customers arrive without a need
to advertise and repay loans with high reliability rates. The key in-
centive to repay is the "borrowers￿desire to keep access to a highly
valued service" (Rosenberg, 2010, p. 4). It seems that target bor-
rowers wish to preserve the microcredit access over time, in order
to cope with possible future shocks. Another observable aspect
concerns the willingness to pay high interest rates on the funds re-
ceived, and accept trivial or no return on savings. In addition, mi-
cro￿nance customers usually return using micro-￿nancial services,
even in the presence of high desertion rates. The repeated use
does not necessarily imply that these services provide bene￿ts. It
is clearly possible that some borrowers will over-indebt themselves,
producing a negative ￿nal outcome. But the high repayment rates
over the long term may justify the assertion that micro￿nance is
not over-indebting great amounts of its users. Surely this presump-
tion needs to be studied and tested by new research.
Finally, as suggested by Rosenberg (2010), an important advan-
tage of microcredit introduction can be thought not as its net im-
pact, but rather as its cost in term of subsidies. In other words,
while social programs such as education and health care might
require consistent amounts of continued subsidies, microcredit, if
well-implemented, can require relatively small initial subsidies that
allow such organizations to expand their business without any fur-
ther kind of subsidy.
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